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OPINION OF THE COURT 
_______________ 
 
JORDAN, Circuit Judge. 
This case involves claims for overtime wages brought 
by employees of American Airlines, Inc. (“American”).  The 
employees allege that American violated the New Jersey Wage 
and Hour Law (“NJWHL”) because the airline’s timekeeping 
system defaults to paying employees based on their work 
schedules, even if they work additional hours outside of their 
shifts and in excess of 40 hours per week.   
 
The employees brought their claims as a putative class 
action and moved for class certification.  The District Court 
decided that all of the requirements for class certification, as 
set forth in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, were met, and 
it thus certified the class.  American appeals that order, arguing 
that the District Court did not conduct a rigorous analysis and 
that several of the requirements of Rule 23, including 
commonality and predominance, were not met.  American 
argues that this case cannot proceed as a class action because 
determining when each employee was actually working will 
necessarily require individualized inquiries.  We agree and will 
therefore reverse the order of the District Court. 
 
I. BACKGROUND 
 
 American’s timekeeping system is programmed to 
calculate pay for employees only for the duration of their shifts, 
excluding an automatic deduction for a 30-minute meal break.  
If an employee clocks in before the employee’s shift begins or 
clocks out after the shift ends, the timekeeping system defaults 
4 
 
to assuming that the employee only worked during the shift, 
rather than working any extra time.  American calls those pre- 
and post-shift clock-in time durations “grace periods.”  The 
grace periods allow employees to avoid having to clock in 
exactly when their shift begins or clock out exactly when their 
shift ends.  Similarly, the timekeeping system’s assumption 
that an employee takes a 30-minute meal break during a shift 
means that employees do not have to return to the time clock 
before and after each meal break.      
 
 If employees actually do perform work during grace 
periods or meal breaks, American’s policy requires them to 
identify for a supervisor the time they worked outside of their 
shift and ask for approval of that time as an “exception” to their 
ordinary work hours.  Otherwise, they are not paid for the time 
worked outside of their shift.   
 
 The class as certified includes all non-exempt, hourly 
employees at American’s Newark Liberty International 
Airport (“Newark airport”) station, who were employed at any 
time from April 29, 2014 through the present.  The named 
plaintiffs are two fleet service employees and seven mechanics 
at that airport.  Fleet service employees handle cargo, assist 
with lavatory services, and help maneuver aircrafts in and 
around hangars.  Mechanics perform repairs and updates on 
airplanes.  A third category of non-exempt hourly-paid 
employees included in the class is passenger service agents, 
who check passengers in and manage boarding at the gates.  
None of the named plaintiffs are passenger service agents.       
 
The plaintiffs complain that, in violation of the 
NJWHL, American did not pay its employees for all time 
worked because its timekeeping system defaults to paying 
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employees based on their work schedules rather than on the 
time they actually spent working.  The plaintiffs also allege 
that, although American purports to have procedures to 
compensate employees for unpaid time, management regularly 
refuses to pay employees for pre- and post-shift work and work 
done during meal breaks.  The claims in the complaint focus 
on three periods of the workday: (1) while the plaintiffs were 
clocked in but before or after their scheduled shift time; (2) 
during their scheduled meal breaks; and (3) while off-the-
clock.   
 
In seeking class certification, the plaintiffs argued that, 
according to the record, once an American employee clocks in, 
the employee begins working until he or she clocks out, and 
the “[e]mployees do not delay or engage in non-job-related 
personal activities while on the clock.”  (D.I. 104-1 at 5.)  
American responded that class certification was inappropriate 
because the record evidence shows that employees arrived 
early and left late for a variety of reasons and engaged in 
personal activities before and after their shifts.  For example, 
American cited one employee as saying that he sometimes 
watched TV before his shift, and another as saying he chatted 
with other mechanics in the break room before his shift began. 
Thus, American argued, the District Court would have to 
engage in individualized inquiries to determine if and when 
there were occasions when a particular employee was not 
compensated for time periods during which he or she was 
actually working while clocked in, and the Court would 
likewise have to engage in individualized inquiries to 
determine when employees were actually working while off 
the clock. 
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The District Court granted the plaintiffs’ motion for 
class certification and created three subclasses.  The first 
subclass was defined as employees who “have been denied 
compensation for work performed before and after their shifts 
while on the clock” (the “Grace Period Subclass”).  (App. at 
3.)  The second subclass was defined as employees “who have 
been denied compensation for work performed during meal 
periods” (the “Meal Break Subclass”).  (App. at 4.)  The third 
subclass was defined as employees “who have been denied 
compensation for work performed before their shifts before 
clocking in, and for work performed after their shifts after 
clocking out” (the “Off-the-Clock Subclass”).  (Id.) 
 
In its order granting class certification, the District 
Court identified two questions it said are common to the class: 
first, whether “hourly-paid American employees at Newark 
Liberty International Airport are not being compensated for all 
hours worked due to the manner in which American operates 
its timekeeping system[,]” and second, “whether American is 
violating the NJWHL by imposing a schedule-based 
compensation system that in theory permits a supervisor to 
authorize compensation for work performed outside of a 
scheduled shift, but in practice discourages employees from 
seeking such authorization[.]”  (App. at 13.)   
 
In determining that the commonality and predominance 
requirements had been met, the District Court cited favorably 
to caselaw regarding conditional certification under the Fair 
Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) and said that plaintiffs had 
presented sufficient “allegations and initial evidence” to certify 
the subclasses “at this juncture.”  (App. at 13, 14.)  The Court 
also said American’s argument that whether the plaintiffs were 
actually working – rather than engaging in personal activities 
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– when clocked in pre- and post-shift was “to be addressed 
during discovery, and does not merit a denial of class 
certification at this juncture[.]”  (App. at 15.)   
 
American petitioned us under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 23(f) for review of the class certification decision, 
and we granted that petition.  This appeal followed.   
 
II. DISCUSSION1 
 
A party seeking class certification must satisfy the four 
requirements of Rule 23(a), as well as the requirements of 
either Rule 23(b)(1), (b)(2), or (b)(3).  In re Hydrogen Peroxide 
Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d 305, 309 n.6 (3d Cir. 2008). Under 
Rule 23(a), 
                                              
1 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1332(d).  Although we conclude that a class cannot be 
certified, that does not mean that the District Court lacked 
jurisdiction.  See Coba v. Ford Motor Co., 932 F.3d 114, 118-
19 (3d Cir. 2019) (holding that a subsequent denial of class 
certification does not divest the district court of subject-matter 
jurisdiction when the court properly exercised jurisdiction 
pursuant to § 1332(d) at the time a claim was filed).  We have 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(e).  “We review a class 
certification order for abuse of discretion, which occurs if the 
district court’s decision rests upon a clearly erroneous finding 
of fact, an errant conclusion of law or an improper application 
of law to fact.  [W]hether an incorrect legal standard has been 
used is an issue of law to be reviewed de novo.”  In re 
Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d 305, 312 (3d Cir. 
2008) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks and 
citation omitted). 
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(1) the class must be so numerous that joinder of 
all members is impracticable (numerosity); (2) 
there must be questions of law or fact common 
to the class (commonality); (3) the claims or 
defenses of the representative parties must be 
typical of the claims or defenses of the class 
(typicality); and (4) the named plaintiffs must 
fairly and adequately protect the interests of the 
class (adequacy of representation, or simply 
adequacy). 
 
Marcus v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, 687 F.3d 583, 590-91 (3d Cir. 
2012) (internal quotation marks omitted).  Assuming a plaintiff 
can show that all of those conditions exist, the requirements of 
Rule 23(b) come into play.  Here, the plaintiffs are proceeding 
under Rule 23(b)(3), which requires proving, first, that 
questions of law or fact common to class members 
predominate over individualized questions, which is 
commonly called the “predominance” requirement, and, 
second, that the class action device is superior to other methods 
for resolving the claims, which is often referred to as the 
“superiority” requirement.  Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).   
 
Class “certification is proper only if the trial court is 
satisfied, after a rigorous analysis” that all of the necessary 
Rule 23 requirements have been fulfilled.  Wal-Mart Stores, 
Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 350-51 (2011).  The Rule “does 
not set forth a mere pleading standard.”  Id. at 350.  As we 
explained in In re Hydrogen Peroxide, “the decision to certify 
a class calls for findings by the court, not merely a ‘threshold 
showing’ by a party, that each of the requirements of Rule 23 
is met.”  In re Hydrogen Peroxide, 552 F.3d at 307.  A rigorous 
analysis requires that factual determinations be made by a 
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preponderance of the evidence.  Mielo v. Steak ‘n Shake 
Operations, Inc., 897 F.3d 467, 483-84 (3d Cir. 2018).  Thus, 
although a trial court has “broad discretion to control 
proceedings and frame issues for consideration under Rule 
23[,]” “a class may not be certified without a finding that each 
Rule 23 requirement is met.”  In re Hydrogen Peroxide, 552 
F.3d at 310.  Prior to certifying a class, a district court must 
resolve every dispute that is relevant to class certification.  Id. 
at 320. 
 
American argues that the District Court did not apply 
the proper class certification standard and that commonality, 
under Rule 23(a), and predominance, under Rule 23(b)(3), 
were not met.  We address those arguments in turn.2 
 
A.  The District Court Did Not Apply the Proper  
 Standard for Class Certification. 
 
The District Court’s analysis departed from the 
standards we have articulated for evaluating a motion for class 
                                              
2 American also says that the District Court erred in 
finding that the superiority requirement was met and that the 
class was ascertainable, as required by our precedent.  See 
Marcus, 687 F.3d at 592-93 (“[A]n essential prerequisite of a 
class action, at least with respect to actions under Rule 
23(b)(3), is that the class must be currently and readily 
ascertainable based on objective criteria.”).  Because we find 
that commonality and predominance were not met and, in this 
case, cannot be met, we do not reach those arguments.  Nor do 
we address the question of adequacy of representation raised 
by the absence of any named plaintiff from among the 
passenger service agents.  
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certification.  Specifically, there are three problems with the 
Court’s decision: first, it in effect certified the class 
conditionally; second, it applied a “pleading” and “initial 
evidence” standard; and third, it failed to resolve conflicts in 
the evidence. 
 
The first problem may spring from confusion about 
class certification under Rule 23 and collective actions under 
the FLSA.  Rule 23, unlike the FLSA, does not allow for 
conditional certification.  See Genesis Healthcare Corp. v. 
Symczyk, 569 U.S. 66, 74 (2013) (“Rule 23 actions are 
fundamentally different from collective actions under the 
FLSA[.]”).  As we have cautioned before, “[c]ertification may 
not be granted because the plaintiff promises the class will be 
able to fulfill Rule 23’s requirements, with the caveat that the 
class can always be decertified if it later proves wanting.  To 
certify a class in this manner is effectively to certify the class 
conditionally, which Rule 23 does not permit.”  Hayes v. Wal-
Mart Stores, Inc., 725 F.3d 349, 358 (3d Cir. 2013).  Instead, 
class certification under Rule 23 requires a district court to be 
satisfied by a preponderance of the evidence that the plaintiff 
has proven each of the Rule’s requirements is met.  See Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 23 advisory committee’s note to 2003 amendments (“A 
court that is not satisfied that the requirements of Rule 23 have 
been met should refuse certification until they have been 
met.”).  The District Court here cited approvingly to a case 
dealing with conditional certifications under the FLSA, and 
twice explained that the plaintiffs had met their burden “at this 
juncture.”  (App. at 14, 15 (emphasis added).)  That reliance 
on, and application of, principles of conditional certification in 
the Rule 23 context cannot be permitted. 
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Similarly, the Court deviated from our precedent by 
employing a pleading and initial evidence standard, rather than 
requiring proof by a preponderance of the evidence.  The 
District Court referred to Rule 23(b)’s requirements as 
“pleading requirements” and said that the plaintiffs had met 
those requirements by setting forth “allegations and initial 
evidence.”  (App. at 8, 12-13.)  But Rule 23 does not set forth 
a mere pleading obligation.  Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. at 350.  The 
District Court’s acceptance of pleading and initial evidence as 
an acceptable standard is similar to the “threshold showing” 
standard we rejected in In re Hydrogen Peroxide, 552 F.3d at 
321.  There we explained that “[a] ‘threshold showing’ could 
signify, incorrectly, that the burden on the party seeking 
certification is a lenient one (such as a prima face showing or 
a burden of production) or that the party seeking certification 
receives deference or a presumption in its favor.”  Id.  So too 
with a pleading or initial evidence standard.  Rule 23 requires 
more than allegations, initial evidence, or a threshold showing.  
It requires a showing that each of the Rule 23 requirements has 
been met by a preponderance of the evidence at the time of 
class certification.  The District Court thus should not have 
determined that the Rule 23 requirements had been met based 
on “allegations and initial evidence.” 
 
Finally, it was error for the District Court to leave 
unresolved conflicts in the evidence before it.  For example, 
the Court did not engage with American’s argument that 
predominance was not met because individualized proof would 
be required to prove that employees were actually working 
during the various time periods for which they claim they were 
not paid.  Instead, the Court noted that the issue would be 
“addressed during discovery and that it does not merit a denial 
of class certification at this juncture[.]”  (App. at 15.)  The 
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rigorous analysis demanded by Rule 23 requires a court to 
resolve such disputes relevant to class certification, before 
being satisfied that each of the Rule’s requirements has been 
met.  Marcus, 687 F.3d at 591.   
 
Because the District Court did not engage in that type 
of analysis, we could vacate and remand for further application 
of the Rule 23 standards.  But because discovery was 
essentially complete when the District Court ruled on the 
motion for class certification, and the plaintiffs have stated that 
no additional discovery is needed to decide the certification 
issue, we will reverse rather than remand, as, based on our 
review of the record, it is clear that commonality and 
predominance cannot be met.  
 
B.  Commonality and Predominance Cannot Be  
 Met. 
 
Rule 23 requires a showing that “there are questions of 
law or fact common to the class.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2).  
“What matters to class certification ... is not the raising of 
common ‘questions’—even in droves—but rather, the capacity 
of a class-wide proceeding to generate common answers apt to 
drive the resolution of the litigation.  Dissimilarities within the 
proposed class are what have the potential to impede the 
generation of common answers.”  Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. at 350 
(emphasis in original).   
 
The predominance requirement “asks whether the 
common, aggregation-enabling, issues in the case are more 
prevalent or important than the non-common, aggregation-
defeating, individual issues.”  Tyson Foods, Inc. v. 
Bouaphakeo, 136 S. Ct. 1036, 1045 (2016).  Courts must “give 
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careful scrutiny to the relation between common and individual 
questions in a case.  An individual question is one where 
members of a proposed class will need to present evidence that 
varies from member to member, while a common question is 
one where the same evidence will suffice for each member[.]”  
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).   
 
The commonality and predominance requirements are 
closely linked.  But the Rule 23(b)(3) predominance 
requirement is “far more demanding than the commonality 
requirement” found in Rule 23(a).  In re Hydrogen Peroxide, 
552 F.3d at 311 (internal quotation marks omitted).  In fact, 
“where an action is to proceed under Rule 23(b)(3), the 
commonality requirement is subsumed by the predominance 
requirement.”  Danvers Motor Co., Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 543 
F.3d 141, 148 (3d Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  If the commonality requirement cannot be met, then 
the more stringent predominance requirement obviously 
cannot be met either.  Cf. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 
U.S. 591, 623-24 (1997) (“Even if Rule 23(a)’s commonality 
requirement may be satisfied …, the predominance criterion is 
far more demanding.”). 
 
The plaintiffs here cannot satisfy even the commonality 
standard.  In its opinion, the District Court identified two 
common questions: first, whether hourly-paid American 
employees at Newark airport are not being compensated for all 
hours worked, and second, whether American has a policy that 
discourages employees from seeking exceptions for work done 
outside of their shifts.  It is not clear, however, how those 
questions can “generate common answers apt to drive the 
resolution of the litigation.”  Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. at 350 
(emphasis in original).  The first question cannot be answered 
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by common evidence about the timekeeping system because a 
yes or no answer tells us nothing about actual common work 
habits, if there are any.  The plaintiffs will still need to go 
through the process of proving that each individual employee 
worked overtime and is thus entitled to additional 
compensation, regardless of any common evidence about 
American’s timekeeping system.   
 
Similarly, the second question cannot drive resolution 
of the plaintiffs’ case because, again, their claims are, at 
bottom, that they were not paid overtime compensation for 
hours worked, not that American’s overarching policy 
regarding exceptions has deprived anyone in particular of 
compensation to which he or she was entitled.  Moreover, the 
record evidence only demonstrated that a policy of not paying 
employees who submitted requests for overtime may have 
existed for one group of employees – the mechanics.  But the 
District Court certified subclasses consisting of all non-
exempt, hourly employees at American’s Newark airport 
station, not just mechanics.  The passenger service agents and 
fleet service employees have different responsibilities and 
supervisors than the mechanics.  Even if one of the groups was 
affected by such a policy, that would not drive the resolution 
of the litigation on a classwide basis, see Reinig v. RBS 
Citizens, N.A., 912 F.3d 115, 129 (3d Cir. 2018) (expressing 
doubt that the conflicting testimony about a company-wide 
policy from plaintiffs with different managers could establish 
commonality and predominance), and thus the second common 
question the District Court identified did not establish 
commonality.    
 
Having failed to show commonality, the plaintiffs 
necessarily failed too in their effort to show predominance, and 
15 
 
it was error for the District Court to conclude otherwise.  
Plaintiffs will have to offer individualized proof to show that 
they were actually working during the various time periods at 
issue, the main point of dispute in this case.  For the Grace 
Period Subclass, the employees cannot rely on the time clock 
to prove when they were actually working because there is 
conflicting evidence about whether they were working the 
entire time they were clocked in.  For example, some 
employees testified that they began working immediately after 
clocking in.  Others testified that they chatted with co-workers 
or watched TV after clocking in but before their shifts began.  
Thus, whether they were actually working pre- and post-shift 
is an open and inherently individualized question. 
 
The District Court also certified the Meal Break and 
Off-the-Clock Subclasses.  The record shows, however, that 
employees were not all working during meal breaks.  Any 
members of the Meal Break Subclass would have to offer 
individualized evidence regarding which meal breaks they 
spent working and for how long.  And, of course, any claim 
that an employee was working off-the-clock would require an 
individualized inquiry as to when and to what extent that 
happened.  There is no easy measure, like the time clock, to 
which the parties can turn to determine the amount of time an 
employee may have been working.  Accordingly, plaintiffs 
would again need to provide particularized evidence to show 
when employees were working, so common issues do not 
predominate over individual ones.  
 
The District Court cited Tyson Foods, Inc. v. 
Bouaphakeo, 136 S. Ct. 1036 (2016), to support its conclusion 
that individualized variations should not defeat class 
certification.  But that case is clearly distinguishable.  In Tyson 
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Foods, the class consisted of employees at a pork processing 
plant who were not compensated for the time spent donning 
and doffing the protective equipment they had to wear at work.  
136 S. Ct. at 1041-42.  The issue before the Supreme Court was 
whether representative evidence could be used to prove the 
amount of time spent donning and doffing, even though 
individual employees took different amounts of time to 
perform those tasks.  Id. at 1041.  There was, however, no 
dispute about what the activity was that Tyson and the 
employees were arguing over.  It was the same for everyone – 
donning and doffing protective gear.  The record evidence 
here, on the other hand, demonstrates that employees were not 
always working while clocked in and there was substantial 
variability in what they were doing, even if some of it could be 
called work.  Accordingly, this case is unlike Tysons Foods, 
and the employees would need individualized, not 
representative, evidence to prove their case.  Thus, 
predominance cannot be established.   
 
III. CONCLUSION 
 
Because the District Court did not perform a rigorous 
analysis, and because commonality and predominance cannot 
be met under a rigorous analysis, we will reverse the class 
certification order. 
